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1I. IntroductIon
In Bilski v. Kappos,2 the Supreme Court held 
the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation 
test” as a useful, but not exclusive, tool in 
determining patent eligibility under §101 of the 
Patent Act.3  Although the test has been criticized as 
being unclear and inappropriate in some situations,4 
the machine-or-transformation test does provide 
some concrete and sensible framework for courts to 
determine the vague and ethereal issue of whether 
1.  Sarah Beth Smith is a 2013 J.D. candidate at American 
University - Washington College of Law. She currently works 
as a student attorney at the Glushko-Samuelson Intellectual 
Property Law Clinic and is interested in intellectual property 
and health law. She holds a B.S.P.H. in Biostatistics from the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Sarah Beth would 
like to thank Professor Jonas Anderson for his help on this 
article.
2.  130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
3.  Id. at 3227 (“This Court’s precedents establish that the 
machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, 
an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed 
inventions are processes under § 101.  The machine-or-
transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an 
invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”).
4.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et. al., Life After Bilski, 
63 Stan. L. rev. 1315, 1324, 1338 (2011) (“Application of 
the transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation 
test produces even more bizarre results.  What does it mean 
to transform something ‘to another state or thing’? . . . .  The 
problem is that the machine-or-transformation test simply 
asks the wrong question.  For example, in Comiskey, the 
arbitration process was unpatentable not because it lacked a 
computer, but because the claim embraced countless arbitration 
arrangements untied to any practical application of their idea.  
The application claimed too much.”); Matthew Moore, In Re 
Bilski and the “Machine-or-Transformation” Test: Receding 
Boundaries for Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, 2010 duke L. 
& tech. rev. i, 7 (2010) (“While the purpose of the machine-
or-transformation test is clear—‘the prevention of pre-emption 
of fundamental principles’—the current doctrine leaves 
many important questions unanswered.”) (citations omitted); 
Brian P. Murphy & Daniel P. Murphy, Bilski’s “Machine-or-
Transformation” Test: Uncertain Prognosis for Diagnostic 
Methods and Personalized Medicine Patents, 20 Fordham 
InteLL. ProP. medIa & ent. L.J. 755, 774–75 (2010) (“In our 
view, the mandatory machine-or-transformation test caused 
the court to strain unnecessarily to try to fit a square peg 
into a round hole by arguing that the claims are methods of 
treatment. . . . It would have been simpler and more effective 
had the court applied the analysis required by the Fundamental 
Principles Exception.”). 
an invention is an abstract idea, law of nature, or 
natural phenomenon.5  Moreover, the test seems to 
provide certainty and consistency in interpreting 
patent eligibility of processes under §101, with 
a few exceptions.6  This paper summarizes how 
federal courts and the Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences (BPAI) have interpreted the 
“transformation” prong of the machine-or-
transformation test after Bilski and examines its 
limitations in Ultramercial and Prometheus.
II. Patent eLIgIbILIty and the machIne-or-  
tranSFormatIon teSt
Section §101 of the Patent Act explains 
what constitutes eligible subject matter for patent 
protection.  “Whoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”7  Courts have said that they will not read 
in limitations into this section that Congress did 
5.  See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3218, 3230–31; Fort 
Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1319–
20, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that the patent failed 
the machine-or-transformation test and was an abstract idea 
ineligible for patentability).
6.  Compare Fort Props., Inc., 671 F.3d at 1319–20, 1323–
24 (holding the patent failed the machine-or-transformation 
test and was an abstract idea), CyberSource Corp. v. Retail 
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding 
the patent failed the machine-or-transformation test and was 
an abstract idea), and CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. 
Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 233–35 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 685 
F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, 2012 
WL 4784336 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding the patent failed the 
machine-or-transformation test and was an abstract idea), with 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab., Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1289, 1296, 1303, 1305 (2012) (holding the patent passed 
the machine-or-transformation test, but was merely a law of 
nature), and Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, CV 09-06918 
RGK, 2010 WL 3360098, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010) 
appeal reinstated, 413 F. App’x 276 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d, 
657 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding the patent failed 
the machine-or-transformation test, but was not an abstract 
idea). 
7.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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not express,8 but they have also found that there 
are three categories of subject matter excluded 
from patentability: abstract ideas, laws of nature, 
and natural phenomena.9  However, all inventions 
operate via natural laws and phenomena and 
emanate from abstract ideas, so courts have been 
forced to set a line somewhere.10  Moreover, the 
Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty11 stated that the 
meaning of the term “process” in §101 is narrower 
than its ordinary meaning because of the inability 
to patent fundamental principles12 that are supposed 
to be “free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none.”13
Three Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s 
and 1980s represent instrumental precedent on how 
courts view subject matter eligibility today.14  In 
Gottschalk v. Benson,15 the Court deemed a process 
that converted binary coded decimal numerals to 
pure binary code using a general-purpose digital 
computer patent ineligible because it would, in 
effect, patent an abstract idea and preempt all uses 
of the formula, even though it qualified as novel and 
nonobvious.16  The Court noted, “The mathematical 
formula involved here has no substantial practical 
application except in connection with a digital 
computer, which means that if the judgment below 
is affirmed, the patent would wholly preempt the 
mathematical formula and in practical effect would 
be a patent on the algorithm itself.”17
In Parker v. Flook,18 the Court also deemed 
a method of updating an alarm limit in a catalytic 
converter using an algorithm patent ineligible.19  
The Court admitted that the patent covered a 
“broad range of potential uses of the method . . 
8.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
9.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“This 
Court has undoubtedly recognized limits to § 101 and 
every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.  
Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.  ‘An idea of itself is 
not patentable.’  ‘A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental 
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, 
as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.’”) 
(citations omitted).
10.  See id. (finding a principal unpatentable).
11.  447 U.S. 303 (1980).
12.  See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588–89 (1978).
13.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Funk Brothers 
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
14.  See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298–1302 (2012).
15.  409 U.S. 63 (1972).
16.  Id. at 71–72.
17.  Id.
18.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588–89 (1978)
19.  Id. at 584.
. [but not] every conceivable application of the 
formula.”20  Although this method did not wholly 
preempt all uses of the algorithm like in Benson, 
the “post-solution” activity of adjusting the alarm 
limit after performing the formula was not sufficient 
to transform the process from unpatentable to 
patentable.21  The Court noted that the patent 
application in Benson did not explain how to select 
the variables used in the formula, disclose the 
chemical processes at work, or divulge the means of 
setting off or adjusting the alarm.22  The fact that the 
application only disclosed a method for updating an 
alarm limit was important in the Court’s decision.23  
When discussing respondent’s argument that the 
Court impermissibly intertwined §101 with other 
requirements for patentability, the Court stated that 
a process implementing a principle in a particular 
application does not automatically qualify as patent 
eligible.24  The Court further noted that it did not 
dissect the components of the patent, but instead it 
assumed that the mathematical algorithm resided in 
the prior art so that the process as a whole included 
no patentable invention.25 
However, the Court found that the method 
for curing rubber using a mathematical formula 
was patent-eligible in Diamond v. Diehr.26  The 
patent application disclosed the use of the well-
known Arrhenius equation for use in the process 
of rubber curing, which the Court determined was 
not “preempt[ing] the use of that equation . . . 
rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the 
use of that equation in conjunction with all of the 
other steps in their claimed process.”27  The Court 
noted the inappropriateness of dissecting the claims 
into old and new elements and then ignoring old 
elements in the §101 analysis.  It also warned lower 
courts not to confuse the subject matter inquiry with 
novelty and non-obviousness, the requirements of 
patentability.28 
In 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit declared that the “machine-or-transformation 
test,” which had its origins in Benson and Diehr,29 
20.  Id. at 586.
21.  Id. at 590–91.
22.  Id. at 586.
23.  Id. at 594–95.
24.  Parker, 437 U.S. at 593.
25.  Id. at 584, 592.
26.  450 U.S. 175 (1981).
27.  Id. at 187.
28.  Id. at 188.
29.  Id. at 184 (“Recently, in Gottschalk v. Benson, we 
repeated the above definition recited in Cochrane v. Deener, 
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was the sole test for determining patent eligibility 
under §101 in In re Bilski.30  The two-pronged 
machine-or-transformation test determines that a 
patent can be eligible for patenting under §101 if 
(1) the claim is tied to a particular machine, or (2) 
the claim transforms an article into a different state 
or thing.31  The patent at issue in In re Bilski was a 
method for hedging risk in commodities trading, 
particularly in energy.32  The Federal Circuit held 
the patent ineligible because the claim did not 
transform an article and the applicants conceded that 
the process was not limited to a specific machine or 
apparatus.33  In analyzing the first prong of the test, 
the Federal Circuit noted, “[t]he transformation must 
be central to the purpose of the claimed process.”34  
As to what sufficiently constitutes transformable 
“articles,” the court held that transformations 
of physical objects using chemical or physical 
processes sufficiently pass the test and qualify 
as patent-eligible subject matter.35  However, 
when explaining how to deal with electronic 
transformations of data, the court cited its decision 
in In re Abele,36 which explained that the claim for 
the transformation of data representing physical 
objects into a visual display was sufficiently narrow 
to qualify as patent eligible under §101, even though 
the physical object underlying the data was not 
transformed in the process.37  Moreover, the Federal 
Circuit stated that adding a mere data gathering step 
to a claim dealing with electronic transformation of 
data could not make it patent eligible.38
adding: ‘Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a 
different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a 
process claim that does not include particular machines.’”) 
(citations omitted).
30.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
31.  Id. at 961–62.
32.  Claim 1 of the patent application reads: “A method for 
managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by 
a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of: 
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity 
provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said 
consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon 
historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk 
position of said consumer; (b) identifying market participants 
for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said 
consumers; and (c) initiating a series of transactions between 
said commodity provider and said market participants at a 
second fixed rate such that said series of market participant 
transactions balances the risk position of said series of 
consumer transactions.”  Id. at 949. 
33.  Id. at 962.
34.  Id.
35.  Id.
36.  684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
37.  Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962–63.
38.  Id. at 963.
The Federal Circuit also discarded two 
previous tests used in the §101 inquiry when it 
deemed the machine-or-transformation test the sole 
test for patent eligibility in In re Bilski.39  Created 
and polished in three prior Federal Circuit decisions, 
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test examined patent 
eligibility through a two-step process.40  First, a 
court would determine whether the claim listed an 
algorithm falling within the meaning of Benson.41  
If so, the court would then move to the second step 
and consider whether the algorithm is “applied in 
any manner to physical elements or process steps.”42  
The State Street test, first described in Alappat, 
inquired whether the process created a “useful, 
concrete, and tangible result.”43  The Federal Circuit 
deemed both tests inadequate in the §101 subject 
matter inquiry.44 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
In re Bilski in 2010 and affirmed the holding, but 
for different reasons.45  The Court stated that the 
machine-or-transformation test did not represent the 
sole test for patent eligibility under §101, but rather 
a “useful and important clue.”46  Although the Court 
refused to reject Bilski’s patent due to its failure 
under the machine-or-transformation test47 or a 
categorical exclusion of all business methods under 
§101,48 the Court did hold that the claims describe 
an abstract concept or algorithm, which does not 
qualify as patent eligible under Benson, Flook, and 
Diehr.49
III. how courtS and the bPaI have uSed and 
InterPreted the “tranSFormatIon” Prong, 
PoSt-Bilski 
After Bilski, federal courts and the BPAI 
have continued to use the machine-or-transformation 
test as a “useful and important clue” in determining 
patent eligibility of process patents.  However, many 
commentators have criticized the test for its lack of 
39.  Id. at 959.
40.  Id. (citing In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 
1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 
684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
41.  Id.
42.  Id. (quoting In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 905–07).
43.  In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
44.  Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959–60.
45.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
46.  Id.
47.  Id.
48.  Id. at 3229.
49.  Id. at 3231.
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clarity and questioned the properness of its inquiry.50  
Court and BPAI decisions since Bilski have created 
a patchwork of cases that do provide some clarity on 
what “transformation” for patent eligibility requires.  
This section summarizes the major themes of 
decisions using and analyzing the “transformation” 
prong to determine patent eligibility after Bilski. 
A. what IS an “artIcLe”?
First, courts and the BPAI have closely 
scrutinized the arguably transformed “article” while 
applying the machine-or-transformation test.  This 
paper argues that the courts and BPAI have done 
so properly because, as the Federal Circuit stated 
in In re Bilski, “[p]urported transformations or 
manipulations simply of public or private legal 
obligations or relationships, business risks, or other 
such abstractions cannot meet the test because 
they are not physical objects or substances, and 
they are not representative of physical objects or 
substances.”51  In Accenture Global Services v. 
Guidewire Software,52 the District Court of Delaware 
found that “file notes,” which include “damages 
incurred to vehicles and real property, and/or injuries 
sustained by people involved in an accident,” do not 
represent “physical and tangible objects” because 
these notes may also include information like “cost 
of automobile repair, hours worked, or the amount of 
medical expenses.”53  Therefore, the court held that 
even if this type of data transformed into a tangible 
visual display, the visual image would not represent 
particular physical articles and, therefore, did not 
qualify as a “transformation” under the machine-or-
transformation test.54  
Similarly, the Federal Circuit held that 
deed-shares, i.e., legal ownership interests in 
property, could not be transformed through the 
claims disclosing an investment tool enabling tax-
free exchanges of property in Fort Properties v. 
American Master Lease.55  The Federal Circuit 
cited Bilski for the proposition that connections 
to the physical world—deeds, contracts, and 
real property—were insufficient to transform an 
abstract concept (a real estate investment tool) 
50.  Moore, supra note 4; Murphy, supra note 4; Lemley, 
supra note 4.
51.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
52.  691 F. Supp. 2d 577, 596 (D. Del. 2010).
53.  Id. at 596.
54.  Id.
55.  Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 
1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
into patentable subject matter.56 In CLS Bank, the 
District Court of the District of Columbia also 
refused to find patent eligibility in claims that 
exchanged “obligations,” holding that obligations 
cannot be transformed because they are “mere 
abstraction[s].”57  However, the Federal Circuit 
reversed on appeal, holding that the claims were 
sufficiently limited to a practical business concept 
and implemented with a computer so that the 
claims were patent eligible.58  The Federal Circuit 
subsequently vacated the decision and granted a 
rehearing en banc.59 
The BPAI has likewise inquired into whether 
claimed articles are physical or tangible objects 
capable of satisfying the transformation prong of 
the machine-or-transformation test.  For example, 
in Ex Parte Weisbach60 appellants argued that the 
process of transforming a rental of a real venue seat 
for a game or a season into an ownership right in the 
real venue seat for the life of the venue constituted 
a valid transformation.61  The BPAI disagreed and 
held that the right to occupy a seat in the venue, like 
the deed-shares in Fort Properties, was an abstract 
concept representing legal ownership interests.62 
Therefore, the ownership interest was incapable 
of being transformed, and the invention was not 
patentable subject matter.63  The BPAI came to a 
similar decision in Ex Parte Ward,64 where it found 
that a process for playing a certain card game, 
which claimed both “physical playing cards” and 
“images of cards,” was too abstract and general to 
be considered an article under the transformation 
prong.65  Additionally, the BPAI has found that 
56.  Id.
57.  CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 
2d 221, 233–35 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), reh’g en banc granted, 2012 WL 4784336 (Fed. Cir. 
2012).
58.  Id. at 1356.
59.  Id.
60.  No. 2010-011353, 2012 WL 760142 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 29, 
2012).
61.  Id. at *3 (“[A]t the core of the right to occupy a 




64.  No. 2010-005500, 2010 WL 4991412 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 6, 
2010) 
65.  Id. at *5 (noting that the claimed method was so 
sweeping as to cover “both known and unknown uses of the 
concept and be performed through any existing or future-
devised machinery”).
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“patient information”66 and an “archive”67 have not 
satisfied the tangible or physical article requirement 
66.  Ex Parte Starkey, No. 2010-007809, 2011 WL 
4434501, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 20, 2011) (explaining that 
transferring patient information into an application is the “mere 
transfer” of information, not a true transformation).
67.  Ex Parte Subbu, No. 2010-001444, 2011 WL 6739373, 
at *3 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 21, 2011) (holding that an “archive” is not 
even a physical “article” within the meaning of § 101).
and therefore the machine-or-transformation test.68  
Nevertheless, the BPAI decided a transformation 
of a virtual object did occur in Ex Parte Ng-Thow-
Hing.69  There, the claimed process included a 
step for determining a value for each parameter 
by optimizing an objective function, which, 
according to the BPAI, resulted in a valid physical 
transformation of a virtual skeleton.70  The dissenting 
opinion, however, disagreed and pointed out that a 
computer model, not an actual physical skeleton, 
was being transformed, so the application should not 
have passed the machine-or-transformation test.71  
B. what IS a “tranSFormatIon”?
After the courts and BPAI have determined 
that the claimed process affects a physical “article,” 
they next closely examine the claims and attempt 
to distinguish transformations from unpatentable 
algorithms.  Courts have found the mere transfer 
or copying of data to be generally insufficient 
to satisfy this inquiry.  For example, the Central 
District of California found Ultramercial’s method 
of downloading an advertisement on the memory 
of the personal computer of the consumer to be 
a mere transfer of data from one memory disk to 
another.72  The court found that the transfer did not 
change the data in any way and therefore did not 
constitute a transformation of an article.73  Similarly, 
68.  Id.; Ex Parte Starkey, No. 2010-007809, 2011 WL 
4434501, at *4.
69.  No. 2009-009095, 2011 WL 341359, at *1–2 (B.P.A.I. 
Feb. 1, 2011) (“[Claim 1 states: a] method for producing a 
subject-specific skeleton from an external measurement data 
set and a generic skeleton, the generic skeleton comprising a 
plurality of parameters, the method comprising: determining 
a set of parameters, wherein the set includes a first parameter 
related to a size of a bone segment in a first dimension and 
a second parameter related to a size of the bone segment 
in a second dimension; applying, for the set of parameters, 
correspondence between the external measurement data set and 
the generic skeleton; and determining, for each parameter in 
the set, a value, by optimizing an objective function.”).
70.  Id. at *2.
71.  Id. at *3–4 (arguing that a computer model is not a 
particular “article” that is being transformed into a different 
state).
72.  Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, CV 09-06918 
RGK, 2010 WL 3360098 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010) appeal 
reinstated, 413 F. App’x 276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) and rev’d, 657 
F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) and dismissed, 457 F. App’x 920 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), order recalled and vacated, 413 F. App’x 276 
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
73.  Id. at *5 (explaining that “[a] method . . . wherein 
media product assessed by the consumer is downloaded to a 
memory of a personal computer of the consumer” is simply a 
data transfer between two computers).
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the District Court of New Jersey held that a process 
of extracting information from a document or filing, 
formatting, and transmitting it to an application 
program was also a “mere transfer” of data in 
Glory Licensing.74  Furthermore, changing the 
files’ formatting did not sufficiently qualify as a 
transformation.75  However, in VS Technologies v. 
Twitter,76 the Eastern District of Virginia refused 
to grant Twitter’s motion for summary judgment 
on the patent eligibility of a process that formatted 
raw data so that knowledgeable or skilled people 
in a particular area could interact with others and 
discuss relevant topics in their particular field in 
real time.77  In VS Technologies, the court decided 
that a reasonable juror could find that the formatting 
process transformed an article into a different state 
or thing.78 
Courts have also deemed collecting, 
comparing, analyzing, and classifying data as 
non-transformations.  In CyberSource v. Retail 
Decisions,79 the Federal Circuit held that the patent 
application failed the transformation prong of the 
test because the claimed process consisted of a 
“mere collection and organization of data regarding 
credit card numbers and Internet addresses.”80  In 
the biotechnology context, the BPAI decided that 
a process of comparing gene expression profiles, 
listing them in clusters, and providing an output 
of the listing did not transform any article under 
the machine-or-transformation test in Ex Parte 
Kelkar.81  The Federal Circuit similarly decided that 
a method comparing and analyzing DNA sequences 
constitutes an abstract mental process and thus was 
74.  Glory Licensing LLC v. Toys R Us, Inc., CIV. 09-
4252 FSH, 2011 WL 1870591, at *4 (D.N.J. May 16, 2011) 
(explaining that the transfer of a file is not a “transformation” 
equivalent to turning “raw data into a particular visual 
depiction of a physical object on a display”).
75.  Id. 
76.  2:11CV43, 2011 WL 4744911 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011).
77.  Id. at *46 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011) (suggesting that 
when the transfer of data allows a user to do something new 
with the data, i.e. “[create] the ability for people to interact in 
real time,” data is likely transformed for the purposes of § 101).
78.  Id. at *5–6.
79.  654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
80.  Id. at 1370 (“The district court found that claim 3 fails 
to meet either prong of the machine-or-transformation test. . . 
. We agree.  As the district court correctly held, the method of 
claim 3 simply requires one to “obtain and compare intangible 
data pertinent to business risks. . . .  The mere collection and 
organization of data regarding credit card numbers and Internet 
addresses is insufficient to meet the transformation prong of the 
test.”) (citations omitted).
81.  Ex Parte Kelkar, No.  2009-004635, 2010 WL 
3768175, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 2010).
not a transformation in Association for Molecular 
Pathology.82  This process did not include any steps 
of extracting or sequencing DNA,83 unlike Myriad’s 
other valid method claims that involved growing 
cells and determining cell growth rates to screen 
potential cancer therapies.84
Courts and the BPAI have also viewed 
processes that update, store, compute, convert, 
decode, evaluate, and select data as lacking a 
transformation because the underlying data or 
information is, again, left unchanged.  For example, 
the process of using a claim “namespace” or 
“simplified scheme” to decode an XML-based 
document did not constitute a transformation 
in Ex Parte Heuer.85  Nor did a process claim 
where content from one forum resource to 
another discussion forum resource qualify as a 
transformation in Ex Parte Banatwala.86  The BPAI 
characterized this as merely copying data from 
one place to another.87  Additionally, in Ex Parte 
Ward,88 the BPAI held that changing the position 
or location of playing cards was an insufficient 
transformation for patent eligibility, if the change 
was a transformation at all.89  Similarly, in Ex Parte 
Caccavale,90 the patent application was aimed at 
“collect[ing] performance parameters from the 
Internet servers in order to determine a measure 
of system performance, and . . . trigger[ing] an 
alarm when the measure of system performance 
indicates a presence of system degradation.”91 
The BPAI boiled this down to merely statistical 
analysis computations, which did not constitute 
82.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2011), 
reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2011), 
cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) 
opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 2010-1406, 2012 WL 
1500104, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2012) aff’d 386 F.3d 1303, 
1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
83.  Id. at 1356.
84.  Id. at 1357–58 (explaining that the additional step of 
“growing” cells, and “determining” growth rates were physical 
manipulations central to the claimed process).
85.  Ex Parte Heuer, No. 2009–004590, 2010 WL 
3072973, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 4, 2010).
86.  No. 2009–006785, 2010 WL 4250887 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 
18, 2010).
87.  Id. at *3.
88.  No. 2010–005500, 2010 WL 4991412 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 
6, 2010).
89.  Id. at *3.
90.  No. 2009–006026, 2010 WL 2901727 (B.P.A.I. July 
23, 2010).
91.  Id. at *1.
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a transformation for patent eligibility purposes.92  
A process of updating a “statistical indicator” 
after “calculating a particular ratio” also failed to 
constitute a transformation in Ex Parte Foulger.93
C. when IS a tranSFormatIon    
 centraL to the cLaImS?
The machine-or-transformation test requires 
that the transformation be “central” to the claimed 
process.94  Hence, courts have found that some 
transformations that occur during a claimed process 
are merely incidental to the claims and do not 
satisfy the transformation prong of the test.95  The 
electronic transformation of data on a hard drive 
has been generally viewed as merely incidental to 
the claimed process and failing the transformation 
prong in software patent applications.96  However, 
physiological and biological transformations 
are rarely, if ever, incidental to claims.97  This 
divergence could be based on a difference in how 
courts approach the analysis of a software patent 
versus a biotechnology patent, or perhaps the 
difference in the nature of the patented inventions 
themselves—i.e., biological transformations are 
92.  Id. at *3.
93.  Ex Parte Foulger, No. 2009-007619, 2010 WL 
5244744, at *3 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 22, 2010); see also Ex Parte 
Vishnubhotla, No. 2009-008510, 2011 WL 126897, at *4 
(B.P.A.I. Jan. 13, 2011) (“‘[U]pdating the database with 
data from the file of interest upon receipt of the database 
trigger’ [does not] qualify as a transformation of an article of 
manufacture in accordance with the transformation prong of 
the machine-or-transformation test.”); Ex Parte Subbu, No. 
2010-001444, 2011 WL 6739373, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 21, 
2011) (“[S]tep (c) does no more than ‘commit’ allocations 
to the archive and step (i) ‘updates’ the archive with new 
allocations.  We are unable to discern and the Appellants do not 
explain in what way an ‘archive’ is transformed into a different 
state or thing as a result of these operations.”).
94.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (“A claimed 
process is patent-eligible if it transforms an article into a 
different state or thing. This transformation must be central to 
the purpose of the claimed process.”); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
95.  See, e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, CV 09-
06918 RGK, 2010 WL 3360098, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 
2010), appeal reinstated, 413 F. App’x 276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
and rev’d, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and dismissed, 457 
F. App’x 920, order recalled and vacated, 413 F. App’x 276 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that electronic transformation of 
data was merely incidental to the claims and therefore did not 
satisfy the machine-or-transformation test).
96.  Id.
97.  See, e.g., Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (U.S. 2011); Classen 
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1068 
(Fed.Cir.2011).
seemingly more intertwined with the patented 
processes. 
In Ultramercial v. Hulu, the Central District 
of California noted that the storing of content on 
the consumer’s computer memory could qualify as 
a transformation, although the Court was skeptical 
that what was stored in a computer memory changed 
its nature.98  However, even if this storage qualifies 
as a transformation, the court found it as “merely 
incidental” to the claimed process of exchanging 
watching advertisements with no-cost media 
access.99  Likewise, in CLS Bank, the District Court 
of D.C. decided that the electronic transformation 
of data, on a microscopic level, constituted an 
incidental transformation and represented an 
“insignificant extra-solution activity” to the claimed 
method of electronically adjusting bank accounts.100  
The court explained that the purpose of the method 
was to exchange obligations, not to electronically 
transform a hard drive or computer memory.101  
Furthermore, if the electronic transformation 
was indeed sufficient to pass the machine-or-
transformation test, the court worried that almost 
any method using a general-purpose computer or 
electronic device with memory could receive patent 
protection.102  
In the biotechnology field, courts have 
more readily found the biological transformation as 
“central” to the claim scope and, therefore, that the 
claimed method qualifies as patent eligible—at least 
before the Supreme Court decided Prometheus.103  
For example, in Acorda Therapeutics v. Apotex,104 
Acorda attempted to patent a method for treating 
patients using a specific drug.105  The defendant, 
Apotex, argued that performing the method only 
required prescribing and dispensing the drug, 
which meant the process was merely mental.106  
Nevertheless, the District Court of New Jersey held 
that the patent required the administration of the 
drug, as well as “the giving, dosing, self-dosing, or 
taking of the composition resulting in ‘a peak plasma 
98.  Ultramercial, 2010 WL 3360098, at *1.
99.  Id.
100.  CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 
2d 221, 235 (D.D.C. 2011).
101.  Id. at 234–35.
102.  Id.
103.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
104.  CIV.A. No. 07–4937 GEB-M, 2011 WL 4074116 
(D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2011).
105.  Id. at *1.
106.  Id.
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tizanidine concentration earlier than about [four] 
hours from administration’ or similar limitation.”107  
Therefore, the patent required a transformation in the 
form of a physiological effect on the human body 
and satisfied the machine-or-transformation test.108 
 The patent in Prometheus claimed a method 
comprised of: administering a particular drug to 
a patient, determining the metabolite level in the 
patient’s blood, and then warning the treating 
physician if the drug dosage was too high or 
too low.109  The Federal Circuit decided that this 
method qualified as patent eligible because the 
administration of the drug created a physiological 
transformation within the patient’s body, and the 
determining step transformed the patient’s blood 
sample in the process.110  These transformations 
were central to the process because without the body 
metabolizing the drug or the blood being analyzed, 
the physician could not know if the dosage was too 
high or too low.111  Moreover, the Federal Circuit 
stated that this patent was not claiming a law of 
nature, i.e., a correlation between metabolite levels 
and toxicity, but rather a particular application of 
naturally occurring correlations.112  However, the 
Supreme Court reversed this decision, as discussed 
below.113
In Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,114 Myriad Genetics, 
Inc. claimed a process for identifying cancer 
therapeutics which involved growing cells with 
an altered cancer gene, with or without a potential 
cancer therapeutic, followed by determining 
and comparing the cells’ growth rate.115  The 
Federal Circuit found that this process physically 
manipulated the cells.  Moreover, this manipulation 
was necessary to identify different substances 
potential use as therapeutic agents, making the 
107.  Id.
108.  Id.
109.  Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 
628 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 
3027 (2011). 
110.  Id. at 1355–56.
111.  Id. at 1357.
112.  Id. at 1355.
113.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
114.  653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied, (Sept. 
13, 2011), reh’g denied, (Sept. 16, 2011), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated sub nom, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), and opinion 
vacated and appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 
2012).
115.  Id. 1357–58.
physical transformation central to the claim scope.116  
The court added that the patent was not claiming a 
scientific principle because it was tied to specific 
types of cells, cancer genes, and therapeutics.117
Finally, in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. 
v. Biogen Idec,118 the District Court of Maryland 
held that a patent claiming a process of immunizing 
patients according to published schedules to prevent 
chronic immune mediated disorders did not qualify 
as patent eligible.119  The district court applied 
the machine-or-transformation test and found that 
the physiological transformation of the patient’s 
body after immunization was “insignificant post-
solution activity.”120  Therefore, the transformation 
was not sufficient to pass this prong of the test, 
and the patentee was trying to patent a natural 
phenomenon.121  The Federal Circuit affirmed 
this holding on appeal,122 but the Supreme Court 
remanded the case in light of its decision in Bilski.123  
On remand, the Federal Circuit reversed its previous 
ruling and found the patent valid under § 101.124  
The Federal Circuit cited Prometheus as supporting 
the patent eligibility of method claims that included 
a transformative immunization.125  
116.  Id.
117. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1358.
118.  CIVIL No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL 6161856 (D. 
Md. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d, 304 F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
cert. granted, judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (U.S. 2010), 
and aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.3d 1057 
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
119.  Id. at *1.
120.  Id.
121.  Id.
122.  Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 304 
F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 
130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
123.  Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 130 
S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
124.  Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 
F.3d 1057, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
125.  Id. at 1068 (“Classen also argues that the claims of 
all three patents meet the machine-or-transformation test of 
this court’s vacated In re Bilski opinion, citing Prometheus 
Laboratories, supra, where this court held that ‘claims to 
methods of treatment are always transformative when one 
of a defined group of drugs is administered to the body 
to ameliorate the effects of an undesired condition.’  On 
the materially different facts in Prometheus and in the 
Classen specifications, the analogy is inapt, for the claims in 
Prometheus are for a method of controlling individualized 
dosages of a specific drug by measuring its metabolic products 
in the blood of individual patients, while the Classen patents 
operate on published information to determine general 
immunization schedules.  The principles applied in Prometheus 
support the patent eligibility of the Classen claims that include 
such transformative steps, but are not relevant to claims that 
require no more than referring to known information but do 
not include immunization in light of that information.  Viewing 
17American University Intellectual Property Brief
IV. “FaILure” oF the machIne-or-
tranSFormatIon teSt: abStract IdeaS 
verSuS LawS oF nature
As the Supreme Court noted in Bilski, the 
machine-or-transformation test, despite being 
non-dispositive, still provides helpful guidance 
in determining patent eligibility.126  Courts have 
continued to perform the machine-or-transformation 
test since Bilski but have had to further determine 
whether the process as a whole is directed to an 
abstract idea.127  However, some processes may fail 
the test but still be patent eligible128 or vice versa,129 
signifying that the test is both over- and under-
inclusive.  Patents involving abstract ideas and laws 
of nature seem to diverge at this point.  Although 
neither the Supreme Court nor any other court has 
explicitly distinguished separate analyses for patent 
eligibility based on whether the process involved an 
abstract idea or law of nature, recent cases suggest 
that the characteristics of abstract ideas and laws of 
nature require different considerations.130  Through 
a patchwork of opinions since Bilski, the test is now 
under-inclusive of Information Age technologies 
that utilize abstract ideas to push forward computer 
technology.131  Additionally, the test is over-
inclusive of processes that operate via laws of 
nature because the transformation involved may be 
a guise for patenting a natural phenomenon, instead 
of its application.132  As courts continue to use the 
machine-or-transformation test to understand patent 
eligibility, it is important to examine whether a 
patent deals with an abstract idea or a law of nature.  
The next section analyzes two cases where the test 
the representative claims of the Classen patents in accordance 
with their purported scope, we conclude that the claims of 
the 8139 and 8739 patents reason-ably meet the threshold 
of § 101 eligibility, and that analysis of the subject matter of 
these claims, and other claims in these patents, should proceed 
by way of the statutory criteria of patentability.”) (citations 
omitted).
126.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
127.  See, e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
128.  See id.
129.  See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012).
130.  Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead–Hand 
Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods 
After In re Bilski, 3 caSe w. reS. J.L. tech. & Internet 1, 
85-86 (forthcoming, 2012), available at http://www.patentlyo.
com/ files/eisenberg.wisdomordeadhand.patentlyo.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2012).
131.  See Ultramercial, 657 F.3d at 1323.
132.  See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1289.
was inadequate and the courts attempted to resolve 
this disparity.
A. abStract IdeaS and Ultramercial
In Ultramercial v. Hulu, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s holding of patent 
ineligibility due to the claimed process’s failure 
under the machine-or-transformation test.133  The 
court stated that the patent “claims a particular 
method for collecting revenue from the distribution 
of media products over the Internet.”134  Although 
the process is a practical application of the general 
concept of advertising as currency, it also required 
more than mental steps because of the controlled 
interaction with consumers on the Internet.135  The 
court viewed the interaction with the consumer 
via the Internet as transforming the method from 
an abstract idea to a specific application of that 
idea, making it patent eligible without any physical 
transformation.136 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Ultramercial to uphold the validity of a process that 
failed the machine-or-transformation test begs the 
question of why this invention differs from all other 
inventions after Bilski that have failed the machine-
or-transformation test and have been subsequently 
deemed patent ineligible.  This decision is therefore 
important in understanding areas where the machine-
or-transformation test does not accurately indicate 
patent eligible subject matter.  The Federal Circuit 
has distinguished Ultramercial from a subsequent 
case, Fort Properties, by explaining that the former 
dealt with “advances in computer technology,” 
while the latter simply claimed a “computer-aided” 
algorithm.137  Therefore, the Federal Circuit seemed 
to declare—and lower courts have followed the 
idea—that the machine-or-transformation test 
insufficiently determines whether an advance 
in computer technology qualifies as patentable.  
However, this test appropriately weeds out 
algorithms merely performed with a computer.138 




137.  Compare Ultramercial, 657 F.3d at 1323 (finding 
patent-eligible subject matter even though the software did 
not pass the machine-or-transformation test), with Fort Props., 
Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(finding patent ineligible subject matter after the software did 
not pass the machine-or-transformation test).
138.  See Fort Props., Inc., 671 F.3d at 1317, 1323 
(“‘Simply adding a ‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim 
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It is unclear what exactly pulls an invention 
from the computer-aided-process realm to the 
advance-in-computer-technology realm.  The Federal 
Circuit stated that Ultramercial’s invention was 
patent eligible because it required complex computer 
programming, was not drawn to purely mental 
processes, and greatly improved previous computer 
technology.139  Moreover, the claim scope had 
meaningful limitations because the patent could not 
be performed without a computer and a controlled 
interaction with the customer.140  On the other hand, 
in Fort Properties, the Federal Circuit held that the 
patent in question was merely an investment tool 
implemented with a computer.141  An investment 
tool was an abstract concept and more of a mental 
process that did not require complex computer 
programming.142  Moreover, the claim scope was 
not meaningfully limited with the process’s use of a 
computer.143  Thus, the Federal Circuit felt this was 
an example of a “computer-aided” process that did 
not deserve patent protection.144
As seen in Part II, courts and the BPAI had 
been fairly restrictive in applying the machine-
or-transformation test after In re Bilski, requiring 
physical steps to satisfy the test.145  Although a non-
covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to 
render the claim patent eligible.’  Dealertrack distinguished 
itself from Ultramercial on the grounds that its claims 
‘recite[d] only that the method [was] ‘computer aided’ 
without specifying any level of involvement or detail,’ while 
the Ultramercial claims required ‘an extensive computer 
interface.’”).
139.  Ultramercial, 657 F.3d at 1328 (“Many of these 
steps are likely to require intricate and complex computer 
programming.  In addition, certain of these steps clearly 
require specific application to the Internet and a cyber-market 
environment.  One clear example is the third step, ‘providing 
said media products for sale on an Internet website.’  And, 
of course, if the products are offered for sale on the Internet, 
they must be ‘restricted’—step four—by complex computer 
programming as well.  Viewing the subject matter as a whole, 
the invention involves an extensive computer interface.  This 
court does not define the level of programming complexity 
required before a computer-implemented method can be 
patent-eligible.  Nor does this court hold that use of an Internet 
website to practice such a method is either necessary or 
sufficient in every case to satisfy § 101.  This court simply 
finds the claims here to be patent-eligible, in part because of 
these factors.”) (citations omitted).
140.  Id. at 1330 (“Unlike the claims in CyberSource, the 
claims here require, among other things, controlled interaction 
with a consumer via an Internet website, something far 
removed from purely mental steps.”).
141.  Fort Props., Inc., 671 F.3d at 1317, 1322.
142.  Id.
143.  Id. at 1323.
144.  Id. at 1324.
145.  Lemley, supra note 4, at 1324–25, 1338. 
physical transformation might be hard to imagine, 
perhaps Ultramercial is one of the situations where 
it does satisfy the machine-or-transformation test, 
but not in the concrete way described by courts.  
The decision in Ultramercial is consistent with the 
Federal Circuit’s opinion in In re Bilski, where the 
court held that physical steps are not needed to pass 
the machine-or-transformation test.146 
A few cases decided since Ultramercial have 
followed this line of reasoning.  The Eastern District 
of Virginia took a step away from the physicality 
requirement of the machine-or-transformation test in 
VS Technologies v. Twitter.147  In VS Technologies, 
the patent claimed a process of formatting of data 
to create a forum for people to discuss and interact 
in real-time.148  Like in Ultramercial, the process 
created something tangible to the consumer via the 
Internet from raw data very different from the end 
product.149  The court in VS Technologies denied the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment because a 
reasonable juror could find that the patented process 
satisfied the machine-or-transformation test even 
without a physical transformation.150  Similarly, 
the Eastern District of California,151 the Southern 
District of New York,152 and the Eastern District of 
Texas153 denied a defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment in a software process patent case because 
a reasonable juror could find the invention patent 
eligible even though no physical transformation 
occurred.  Perhaps courts are opening up to the idea 
that transformations in the computer technology 
field do not always have to be physical when the 
overall invention moves technology further and are 
learning how to better separate these inventions from 
those in Bilski. 
B. LawS oF nature and PrometheUs
On May 20, 2012, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
146.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
147.  2:11CV43, 2011 WL 4744572, at *1 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 
2011).
148.  Id.
149.  Id. 
150.  Id.
151.  Iconfind, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2:11-CV-0319-GEB-
JFM, 2012 WL 158366, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2012).
152.  Island Intellectual Prop. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 
09 CIV. 2675 KBF, 2012 WL 386282, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 
2012).
153.  Prompt Med. Sys., L.P. v. Allscriptsmysis Healthcare 
Solutions, Inc., 6:10-CV-71, 2012 WL 678216, at *1 (E.D. Tex. 
Feb. 13, 2012).
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Prometheus.154  The Court held Prometheus’s 
patents ineligible because they did not significantly 
claim anything more than a law of nature.155  The 
Court examined each step of the claimed process, 
explaining that each step was not a law of nature 
and also not enough to transform the nature of the 
claim.156  According to the Court, the first step of 
“administering” the drugs merely involved the 
preexisting audience of doctors who treat patients 
with autoimmune disorders.157  Moreover, the 
Court cited Bilski for the proposition that this was 
not a meaningful limitation to the laws of nature 
because limiting the use of the abstract idea or law 
of nature to a particular technological environment 
could not be used to “circumvent” the exclusion 
of patenting abstract ideas.158  The second step of 
the process, called the “wherein” clause, simply 
informed the physician of the laws of nature and 
trusts her to apply it appropriately.159  The third 
step of “determining” the metabolite levels in 
the blood merely instructed the physician to use 
whatever known process she preferred to determine 
the metabolite levels.160  The Court declared this 
step conventional and routine for scientists in the 
field, and “‘conventional or obvious’ ‘[pre]-solution 
activity’ was normally not sufficient to transform 
an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible 
application of such a law.”161  Finally, the Court 
examined the method as a whole and held that the 
combination of steps does not add anything more 
to the laws of nature than when each step was 
considered separately.162  Therefore, the steps were 
not sufficient to constitute patentable applications of 
unpatentable natural correlations.163
154.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
155.  Id. at 1291.
156.  Id. at 1298.
157.  Id. at 1297.
158.  Id. 
159.  Id. 
160.  Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1297–98.
161.  Id. at 1298.
162.  Id.
163.  Id. (“The upshot is that the three steps simply tell 
doctors to gather data from which they may draw an inference 
in light of the correlations.  To put the matter more succinctly, 
the claims inform a relevant audience about certain laws of 
nature; any additional steps consist of well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific 
community; and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add 
nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken 
separately.  For these reasons we believe that the steps are not 
sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations into 
patentable applications of those regularities.”).
The Supreme Court also discussed the 
machine-or-transformation test briefly in its 
opinion.164  The Court seemed skeptical that the 
process recited meaningful transformations.165  
According to the Court, the “administering” step 
merely selected the group of people interested in 
applying the law of nature.166  Furthermore, the 
“determining” step did not require a transformation 
to occur if science developed a completely new 
system for determining the metabolite levels.167  The 
Court then proceeded to cite Bilski in asserting that 
the machine-or-transformation test was only an 
“important and useful clue” to the § 101 inquiry and 
stated that the test failed here.168
Although the machine-or-transformation 
test faced criticism for its lack of applicability to 
Information Age inventions because of its supposed 
physicality requirement,169 Prometheus exposed the 
shortcomings of the test as currently applied in the 
biotechnology industry as well.  The Supreme Court 
has never defined “law of nature” or “abstract idea,” 
but the former is inherently tied to physical, tangible 
objects in the real world while the latter is not 
because a law of nature is discovered in the universe 
and an abstract idea is created from one’s mind 
and imagination.170  Laws of nature are inherently 
164.  Id. at 1303.
165.  Id.
166.  Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
167.  Id.
168.  Id.
169.  See, e.g., Ben McEniery, Physicality and the 
Information Age: A Normative Perspective on the Patent 
Eligibility of Non-Physical Methods, 10 chI.-kent J. InteLL. 
ProP. 106, 133–34 (2010) (“As Judge Rader noted in dissent 
in In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation 
test propagates unanswerable questions surrounding the 
extent and degree of physicality needed.  Dispensing with 
the physicality requirement avoids those difficult and 
arbitrary questions.  It removes from the patent eligibility 
analysis difficult questions such as: What form or amount 
of ‘transformation’ is needed? When is a transformation of 
data that is ‘representative’ of a physical object sufficiently 
linked to that object to satisfy the transformation test?  What, 
in theory and in practice, is the material difference between 
data ‘representative’ of a physical object and data which are 
not?  What link to a machine is sufficient to invoke patent 
eligibility?  Is a general purpose computer running a software 
program a ‘specific machine?’  If under United States law, § 
101 recognizes ‘machines’ as a category of patentable subject 
matter, why does the ‘process’ category require a machine 
prong, and if it does, what connection with a machine is 
necessary?  Does the machine prong of the machine-or-
transformation test require that a process be a machine or that it 
merely involve or rely on the use of a machine?”).
170.  This is not to say that abstract ideas cannot also 
be tied to tangible objects in the world.  See, e.g., Bilski 
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (holding that the 
invention was an abstract idea tied to real-world objects).
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transformative because, by definition, they recite 
recurring facts or events in the physical world.171  
Although some commentators do not agree with the 
Supreme Court that the correlation in Prometheus 
is in fact a law of nature because it requires medical 
intervention to occur,172 this paper does assume that 
the correlation is a law of nature.  To determine 
whether a patentee is trying to claim an entire law 
of nature or just its application, the machine-or-
transformation test no longer seems to be a useful 
tool after Prometheus because the presence or 
absence of a “transformation” in the process does 
not distinguish the two. 
Breyer’s opinion noted that methods of 
treatment would still be patentable, in contrast to 
Prometheus’s patent.173  He stated that a method 
of treatment differed from the Prometheus patent 
because a method of treatment adds significant 
steps to the law of nature, taking the invention 
from the law of nature itself to an application of 
nature.174  Conceptually, the difference is hard to 
actually understand.  Both processes would consist 
of the same transformative step of administering the 
drug to a patient whose body then metabolizes it 
according to a law of nature.  The resulting toxicity 
or ineffectiveness from a drug metabolite level 
seems conceptually similar to a particular health 
outcome caused by a drug metabolite.
However, a difference between the two 
types of processes exists in the timing and nature 
of the transformations involved.  In Prometheus, 
the Supreme Court characterizes the invention 
as a mere correlation between a drug metabolite 
171.  See Law of nature, brItannIca onLIne encycLoPedIa, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 406522/law-
of-nature (last visited October 21, 2012) (describing a law of 
nature as a universal order in natural phenomena).
172.  Robert R. Sachs, Punishing Prometheus: The 
Supreme Court’s Blunders in Mayo v. Prometheus, PatentLy-o 
(Mar. 26, 2012, 9:10 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/
patent/2012/03/punishing-prometheus-the-supreme-courts-
blunders-in-mayo-v-prometheus.html.  But see Prometheus, 
132 S. Ct. at 1297 (“While it takes a human action (the 
administration of a thiopurine drug) to trigger a manifestation 
of this relation in a particular person, the relation itself exists 
in principle apart from any human action.  The relation is a 
consequence of the ways in which thiopurine compounds are 
metabolized by the body—entirely natural processes. And so 
a patent that simply describes that relation sets forth a natural 
law.”).
173.  Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1302 (“For here, as we 
have said, the steps add nothing of significance to the natural 
laws themselves.  Unlike, say, a typical patent on a new drug or 
a new way of using an existing drug, the patent claims do not 
confine their reach to particular applications of those laws.”).
174.  Id.
and toxicity/ineffectiveness, which contains no 
inherent transformation.175  The Court noted 
that transformations that occurred in the process 
resulted from conventional steps added to the law 
of nature.176  The use of the drug for treating the 
condition, the process of the body metabolizing the 
drug, and the administering and determining steps 
were all known in the prior art or are obvious to 
someone skilled in the art.177  On the other hand, 
with a patent for a method of treatment, the use 
of the drug for a particular health outcome in the 
patient constitutes the invention.  A transformation 
occurs when the body uses this drug to help the 
patient’s condition in some way, which is what is 
being invented.  This transformation is not novel or 
obvious because this is the heart of the invention.  
The transformation in Prometheus should be 
classified as “merely incidental” to the claimed 
invention and therefore insufficient for patent 
eligibility.  Although the machine-or-transformation 
test effectively invalidates unpatentable algorithms 
that simply require a computer for performance,178 
the test fails in detecting unpatentable laws of 
nature embedded in conventional and insignificant 
transformations, like in Prometheus. 
This approach to determining a 
transformation, however, arguably takes into account 
other criteria for patentability, especially novelty, 
nonobviousness, and claim scope.  Courts have 
deemed § 101 a separate criterion for patentability, 
but courts must focus on what the invention is to 
determine if it is patent eligible.  Additionally, in 
order to determine what the invention is, the patent 
application must be examined in these ways to 
determine what the heart of the actual invention is 
and look beyond any evasive drafting techniques like 
the Supreme Court did in Prometheus.  Therefore, 
the other requirements for patentability are implicitly 
linked in any patent eligibility discussion, and this 
does not seem improper.  The subject matter inquiry 
remains a separate question using distinct criteria 
from others.  For example, this patent applications 
inquiry does not impose a requisite level of novelty 
175.  Id. at 1296 (“Prometheus’ patents set forth laws 
of nature—namely, relationships between concentrations 
of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a 
dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause 
harm.”).
176.  Id. at 1299–1300.
177.  Id. at 1297.
178.  See, e.g., Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 
671 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that the computer 
program for a real estate investment tool failed the machine-or-
transformation test and was patent ineligible).
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or nonobviousness.  Rather, a particular departure 
from laws of nature is required, which can only be 
achieved by distinguishing the law of nature from 
the invention and examining the separation between 
the two concepts.  Under the transformation prong 
of the machine-or-transformation test, this departure 
from the underlying law of nature can be achieved 
through the inventive process’s transformation of 
an article.  The Prometheus Court was bothered by 
the notion that the transformation could simply be 
a law of nature, as evidenced by its holding that the 




 The machine-or-transformation test after 
Bilski has been interpreted with enough consistency 
and rigidity to provide certainty but also allows 
some room for technology-specific application.  
With patents involving abstract ideas (like computer 
technology), the transformation analysis will 
usually provide the correct result.  As discussed in 
Part III, requiring (1) transformation of a physical 
object, (2) a transformation to be more than just 
a simple algorithm or transfer of data, and (3) the 
insignificance of post-solution activity—like the 
electronic transformation of data—are each very 
important thresholds that will prevent mathematical 
formula and other computer processes from being 
patentable.  These unpatentable processes are 
important to determine what qualifies as patent 
ineligible because they would otherwise be clearly 
ineligible as abstract ideas without implementation 
on a general purpose computer, but with these 
processes, they can be easily disguised as processes 
that are patent eligible. 
 However, as in Ultramercial, the 
transformation analysis may also deem processes 
ineligible that strongly deserve patent protection.  
If a court determines that a computer technology 
patent is patent ineligible under the “traditional” 
transformation analysis, the inquiry should then 
shift to determine whether the invention is merely 
a computer-aided algorithm—and therefore patent 
ineligible—or an advance in computer technology, 
which is patent eligible.  Advances in computer 
technology should be considered transformative, 
even though such processes may not fit into the 
normal transformation framework.  Transformations 
in these processes should be found in the processes’ 
improvements to existing computer technology, 
thereby transforming the technology.
 With patents involving laws of nature 
(such as biotechnology patents), courts should first 
perform the transformation analysis as done with 
patents involving abstract ideas and described in Part 
III.  If the patent appears to pass the transformation 
prong at that point, an additional inquiry is needed 
as to whether the transformation is inventive or 
whether it is the result of a series of conventional 
steps aiming to disguise a law of nature as a 
patentable process.  After Prometheus, courts should 
start closely scrutinizing these transformations that 
are easily connected to laws of nature to determine 
if they are merely incidental to the invention.  If 
so, and the only inventive concept left is the law of 
nature, then the invention must be deemed ineligible. 
 However, if the transformation using the 
law of nature is part of the invention, i.e., the 
transformation is novel and nonobvious, then the 
process should be patent eligible.  For example, 
in a method of treatment patent that claims a 
process for using a known drug for a new purpose, 
the method would be patent eligible because the 
transformation of the body with the drug to treat a 
particular disease was not known or obvious.  In 
comparison, the patent in Prometheus is not patent 
eligible because the drug’s transformative effect on 
a person’s body was already known, and only the 
correlation between metabolite levels and the drug’s 
toxicity/ineffectiveness were not, which is not by 
itself a transformation.  If conventional steps must 
be performed—e.g., administering and determining, 
like in Prometheus—for a transformation to 
occur, this transformation should be considered 
not central to the claims.  Such insignificant post-
solution activity should be considered insufficient 
to transform the invention into patent eligible 
subject matter.  This secondary inquiry for patents 
involving laws of nature differs greatly from that 
of patents involving abstract ideas.  But these two 
different secondary inquiries allow the machine-
or-transformation test to strike a balance between 
being flexible enough to accurately determine patent 
eligibility and retaining its certainty and consistency.
As demonstrated in this paper, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bilski and subsequent decisions 
have created a patchy understanding of what 
constitutes a patentable “process” under §101, 
despite the Federal Circuit’s attempt to add certainty 
and clarity to the jurisprudence of patent eligibility 
with its machine-or-transformation test in In re 
Bilski.  As the transformation analysis clarifies a 
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need for a physical change on a physical object—
or data representing one—that is significant and 
necessary to the claims, a necessary divergence 
between abstract ideas and laws of nature seems 
to exist in the analysis.  While the machine-or-
transformation test aptly deems computer-aided 
algorithms patent ineligible, advances in computer 
technology that should be eligible are declared to 
the contrary because of their lack of physicality.  
Meanwhile, biotechnology processes satisfy the 
test because of their inherent physicality even 
though diagnostic methods now are likely no more 
than unpatentable laws of nature in the form of 
correlations. 
